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  Paul Guyer

1.
Laurent Stern’s Interpretative Reasoning is not primarily a
work in aesthetics. It is a work on the conditions for the
interpretation of acts in general and speech-acts in particular,
which makes some use of Kant’s analysis of aesthetic
judgment in its model of sound interpretative practice, and
discusses the interpretation of works of art as one example of
the category of contestable interpretations. The latter fact
explains why we discussed it at a meeting of the American
Society for Aesthetics (Eastern Division), and the former the
otherwise inexplicable fact that I was invited to be one of the
discussants. But I was happy at both of these circumstances,
for it is a fascinating and powerful work that I was glad to
have had the opportunity to study. I will spend some of my
space here on the relation between Stern’s model of
interpretation and Kant’s model of aesthetic judgment, and
some of it discussing Stern’s model of the interpretation of
works of art and Kant’s account of the experience of fine art.
But first I will need to sketch Stern’s general approach and to
say something about his attack upon what he calls “deep
interpretation,” which is the animus of his work. Stern’s
concept and criticism of deep interpretation is also a focus of
John Gibson’s essay in this symposium.
Stern opens with the statement that “This book is about the
activity of interpreting. In interpreting, we talk about what
was said or done” (p. 1). More specifically, what he means by
an interpretation is an assertion about a speaker’s or agent’s
illocutionary intent in his or her speech-act or action more
generally; an interpretation is one person’s claim about what
another agent has meant in a speech-act or an action more
generally. However, Stern adds that “Most of the time we
understand what was said or done without any interpretation”
(p. 23), or “In the large majority of cases there is no need for
an interpretation; we understand what is at issue immediately
and without further inquiry” (p. 45). Interpretation is needed
only when the speaker’s or agent’s meaning is not immediately
obvious, so Stern’s account of interpretation is not meant to
be a completely general account of understanding the
intentions of others. At the same time, it is not meant to be
an account of “deep interpretation,” or the interpretation of
meanings that are not obvious to the interpreter because they
are not obvious to or are even inaccessible to the speaker or
agent, for it is an attack upon the idea of deep interpretation
so understood. So it is a theory of the conditions for the
interpretation of meanings that are accessible to their speaker
or agent but are not immediately transparent to other
interpreters. Stern holds that “interpretations” in his sense
“are not susceptible to any sort of litmus test,” and his central
claim is that for this reason “the implications of our claim” to
interpret another “have to be expressed in terms of what
reasonable and well-informed interpreters will (or would, or
even ought to) say in interpretive situations” (p. 1). His
argument is that sound interpretation rests on what he calls

the “Universalizability Principle,” the principle that “Every
reasonable person who is familiar with the circumstances
understands what is at issue the way I do” (p. 9). That is, in
order to make a not immediately obvious but justifiable claim
about what another means by his words or actions, an
interpreter must believe that his interpretation is consistent
with the facts as he knows them, that his interpretation is the
“best available for a given,” relevant purpose — these are
what Stern calls the “factual” and “normative” constraints on
interpretation — and that any reasonable person who shares
his understanding of the factual and normative assumptions
about the case at hand would agree with his interpretation.
This kind of interpretation even allows for cases in which there
is disagreement between the speaker and the interpreter
because the speaker is not as well-informed as the interpreter
is or is not being as reasonable as the interpreter is; this will
lead to a “natural interpretation in the subjunctive mood” (p.
11), the “subjunctive” being the assumption that the speaker
would agree with the interpreter’s interpretation of his own
meaning or intention if he were more fully informed about the
facts of his own circumstances or were being more
reasonable. (As Gibson points out, the subjects of
interpretation will not always agree with others’ interpretations
of their words or actions because subjects as well as
interpreters can be ill-informed or irrational.)
2.
However, Stern rejects what he calls deep interpretation,
which is the case in which the speaker would not agree with
the interpreter’s interpretation of his meaning or intention
even if he were better informed about his circumstances and
fully reasonable, because such deep interpretation rests not on
the Universalizability Principle but on the “Restrictive Principle,”
which is the premise that “Only reasonable persons who are
familiar with the circumstances understand what is at issue the
way I do,” or “All persons who understand what is at issue the
way I do are reasonable and familiar with the circumstances”
(p. 10). Whereas the Universalizability Principle claims that,
with proper information, all reasonable persons would agree
with my interpretation, the Restrictive Principle makes the
weaker claim that all persons who agree with me are
reasonable, leaving open the possibility that some reasonable
persons who are equally well informed about the matter under
interpretation do not agree with me. Stern seems to think
that it can only be this principle that is appealed to in offering
a deep interpretation because even if the person whose action
or speech-act is under interpretation is assumed to be
reasonable, he will reject the deep interpretation. The real
thrust of Stern’s concept of deep interpretation is that it is one
to which the interpretee is supposed to be, as it were,
permanently resistant but in which the interpreter nevertheless
claims to be justified. Marxism, Nietzscheanism, and
Freudianism are Stern’s paradigm cases of deep interpretation
(p. 20), the first presumably being the theory that ideological
positions are always motivated by economic interest even
when agents refuse to believe it, the second that religious
beliefs are always motivated by power relations even when
agents refuse to believe it, and the third that various sorts of
dysfunctional behaviors are always motivated by unresolved
sexual issues even when agents refuse to believe it.

Stern then rejects the justifiability of deep interpretation
because he thinks that deep interpretations always involve an
unsustained claim by the interpreter that the speaker is selfdeceived, and an insincere appeal by the interpreter to the
alleged fact that some reasonable people do agree with him
when what he really means is that all reasonable people
should agree with him. The advocate of a deep interpretation
holds “on to the Universalizability Principle in a backstage
whisper while he loudly proclaims from center stage that he
has retreated to a more modest position” (p. 2). Deep
interpretations are offered when the interpreter is convinced
that the facts do not support what the speaker believes, that
the speaker sincerely believes what he claims to believe but is
blamably mistaken in so doing, and that the interpreter knows
better what the speaker means than does the speaker himself
because the interpreter is justified in relying “on a set of
interconnected beliefs about human nature — an overt or
covert rudimentary theory — supporting the claim that he
knows what the speaker meant better than the speaker
himself” (p. 15). However, I take Stern to hold, the
interpreter in a case of deep interpretation is not justified in
his claim that the speaker is necessarily self-deceived nor in
his appeal to “some” other reasonable people for the truth of
what is in fact his own non-scientific claim about the “real”
motive of the speaker, and thus deep interpretation is
necessarily disreputable.
There may be less sting to Stern’s critique of deep
interpretation than initially appears. Part of what he argues is
that if the purported science on which the deep interpretation
is supposed to rest actually becomes widely accepted, then
success will change “deep-level into surface-level
interpretation and its supporting theory into a common-sense
view or scientific theory,” so the only deep interpretation that
is really to be criticized is that on which the interpreter
continues to insist in spite of the failure of his purported
science to win acceptance (p. 21). I do not think that anyone
would want to defend deep interpretation if it is by definition
interpretation that purports to be scientific but is actually
resistant to the real progress of science. If that is all that
Stern means to reject, then I have no argument with him. I
am not sure, however, that this is all he means to reject. In
any case, I find something odd both in his characterization of
the role of the Universalizability Principle in ordinary,
defensible cases of “surface” rather than deep interpretation,
and in his characterization of the deep interpreter’s
assumption about the self-deceived state of his subject. I will
discuss the second of these points briefly and the first at
somewhat more length before I turn to Stern’s discussion of
interpretation in specifically aesthetic contexts.
My further worry about Stern’s characterization of deep
interpretation is that he seems to treat the deep interpreter’s
explanation of the underlying meaning (or motive) of the
speaker as an alternative at, so to speak, the same level as
the speaker’s explanation of his meaning, so that for the deep
interpretation to be true, the speaker’s own interpretation of
his meaning has to be false and therefore the speaker has to
be self-deceived about his own meaning. But deep
interpretations might also be thought of as explanations of
why certain sorts of speaker have the intentions that they do,

so that it is not false that the speakers have those intentions,
but the fact of their having those intentions is to be explained
in a way that the speakers do not realize or recognize. In this
case, speakers would not need to be self-deceived about their
own intentions but would rather be ignorant of the explanation
of those intentions. I would not want to argue that this model
would work in every case of deep interpretation, but if it works
in some cases, then my model would undercut the blanket
charge that every deep interpretation makes an implausible
claim that the subject of the interpretation is self-deceived and
not merely ignorant of the deeper causes of human behavior.
If we undercut this claim, and if we also show Stern’s charge
that deep interpretation always involves insincere or pseudoscience to be true merely by definition, then I think we can
conclude that proposed deep explanations of human behavior,
Marxist, Nietzschean, Freudian, or otherwise, have to be
individually evaluated rather than antecedently rejected on the
basis of Stern’s general argument.
3.
Now I turn to Stern’s more general claim that in offering any
interpretation the interpreter employs a claim that other
reasonable people agree with him, all other reasonable people
in the case of a sincere surface explanation and only some
other reasonable people in the case of an insincere deep
interpretation, as a premise in the justification of his claim. I
can well imagine that someone might appeal to the agreement
of some other reasonable people, in particular purported
experts, in trying to defend a controversial deep
interpretation. But that would be an act of desperation
induced by the inadequacy of the interpreter’s evidence for his
controversial interpretation. In the ordinary case, it seems to
me, the interpreter does not use his purported agreement with
other reasonable people as a premise in the justification of his
interpretation, but rather claims such agreement as the
conclusion of the evidence that he takes to justify his
interpretation. And this, it seems to me, is the lesson of
Kant’s analysis of what it takes to speak with a “universal
voice” in making an aesthetic judgment, not, as Stern seems
to think, that a claim to agreement with all other reasonable
people is a premise in the justification of a judgment of taste
or any interpretive claim.
It might initially seem surprising that Stern appeals to Kant
rather than to Hume (who is mentioned only once in Stern’s
book, in a completely different connection). One might have
expected from Stern’s initial suggestion that, because there
are no “litmus tests” for interpretation, we instead rely, in
trying to justify our interpretations, upon claims about what
“reasonable and well-informed interpreters” believe, that he
would appeal to Hume’s argument in “Of the Standard of
Taste” that, in the absence of rules for beauty or other
aesthetic merits that apply directly to objects (that is, rules
that specify that if objects have certain particular nonaesthetic properties then they necessarily have certain
aesthetic merits), we turn to the collective judgments of a
body of optimally perceptive, well-informed, and reasonable
critics to discover a canon of objects of good taste rather than
the unavailable rules for beauty. Stern is right not to turn to
Hume, however, for he is trying to analyze how people can

support their own authoritative interpretive claims (and to
distinguish that from how they unsuccessfully support their
non-authoritative and indeed unjustifiable deep
interpretations), while Hume is looking for a strategy for
people who do not feel that they can make authoritative
judgments of taste, people who fear that there is no disputing
about tastes and thus no way for them to locate canonical
objects of taste in the midst of a welter of competing claims.
Hume’s argument is that while there is no direct disputing
about objects of taste on the basis of rules about aesthetically
determinative properties, there is a fact of the matter about
who are the qualified judges of good taste, and that those of
us — the vast majority — who are not in an optimal position to
find the best objects of taste on our own can nevertheless
enjoy the best objects because the qualified critics can lead us
to them. We are all capable of “relishing” the fine strokes that
those critics will point out to us. Hume’s model is not one on
which an interpreter attempts to justify his own judgment by
claiming that any, some, or all reasonable persons agree with
him or would if they had all the information he does; it is one
on which ordinary persons who recognize that they do not
themselves have all the experience and refinement of the best
critics seek to improve their own aesthetic experience and in
turn their judgment by following the recommendations of
those critics. It is a model, in other words, of how those who
recognize themselves to be less than optimally qualified judges
defer to those whom they recognize to be more qualified for
the benefits that will bring them, not one on which subjects
seek to justify their own judgments by appealing to the
agreement of others.
But can Stern successfully invoke Kant instead of Hume in
defense of his own model of interpretation? In my view, Stern
is right to invoke Kant’s claim that it is a necessary condition
for making a sincere judgment of taste that one speak on the
basis of one’s own experience of an object rather than merely
reporting the claims of others, but wrong to appeal to Kant in
support of the view that a claim to the agreement of all other
reasonable people is a premise for a judgment of taste or, by
an analogy, a claim for the correctness of an interpretation.
For Kant, the claim that if one has in fact made one’s own
judgment of an object correctly then others who also
experience it under optimal conditions can be expected to
judge it the same way — that is, to experience the same
pleasure in it that one has oneself experienced — is the
content of the judgment of taste. It is what is meant by
calling the object beautiful, not the premise or justification for
it.
The intellectual puzzle of the judgment of taste for Kant is to
explain on what basis one can claim the agreement of others
with one’s own judgment of an object in face of the fact,
already demonstrated by Hume, that judgments of taste
cannot be driven by rules about the properties of their
objects. Stern takes himself to be following Kant in holding
that “Interpretations supported by the Universalizability
Principle occupy the space between idiosyncratic, sectarian, or
essentially contestable interpretations on one side and facts or
true descriptions on the other. It would be disingenuous for
the solitary interpreter to suggest that the aesthetic properties
he has ascribed to an artwork are facts about that artwork, or

to claim support by the Restrictive Principle for what he has
said about that artwork. If he claimed such support, he could
just as well admit that his interpretation is idiosyncratic,
sectarian, or essentially contestable.” Or, if he claimed such
restricted agreement with his pleasure in an object, he should
refrain from calling it beautiful. “As long as he stands by his
interpretation, he must dig in his heels, and support it with the
Universalizability Principle” (p. 159). But Kant never envisions
us as appealing to the agreement of all others in support of
our judgments of taste. He envisions the assertion of the
agreement of others, under optimal conditions, with our own
pleasure in an object as the content of our judgments of taste,
to be supported by the premise that our pleasure in an object
is due to a particular response of our cognitive faculties to it, a
response that can be expected to occur in others because the
cognitive faculties work pretty much the same way in all
human beings.
The premises for a judgment of taste in Kant’s analysis are the
assumptions, first, that the cognitive faculties work the same
way in all human beings, thus that they can produce a
pleasing free play of imagination and understanding in
response to a particular object in all human beings whose
response is not distorted by some suboptimal condition if they
produce that in any human being whose response to that
object is not distorted by some such condition; and, second,
that the pleasure felt by the person making the judgment of
taste has in fact been produced by that shareable free play of
his cognitive powers rather than by some idiosyncratic
condition. If those two assumptions are sound, then a subject
is justified in calling an object beautiful, that is, in asserting
that all other well-functioning human beings responding to the
object under optimal conditions would share his own pleasure
in it. Thus his claim that all other reasonable people would
agree with his response to the object is the conclusion of his
reflection on his aesthetic experience, not a premise in that
reflection.
This structure is, I believe, apparent in Kant’s central
descriptions of judgments of taste and their justification. In
§8 of the “Analytic of the Beautiful” of the Critique of the
Power of Judgment, where he introduces his idea of speaking
with a universal voice, Kant writes that “The judgment of taste
does not itself postulate the consensus [Einstimmung] of
everyone (only a logically universal judgment can do that,
since it can adduce grounds); it only ascribes this consensus
to everyone [es sinnt nur jedermann diese Einstimmung an],
as a case of the rule with regard to which it expects
confirmation not from concepts but only from the assent of
others. The universal voice is thus only an idea (on what it
rests will not yet be investigated here).”[1] The point here is
that universal consensus with or assent to one’s own judgment
of an object is not the premise of the judgment of taste, but
what is claimed by it, on other grounds yet to be explained,
but about which we know at this point in Kant’s exposition that
they cannot include the subsumption of the object under a
determinate concept. In that case it would be a “logical”
rather than an “aesthetic” judgment, that is, one that not only
concerns but is also made on the basis of one’s feeling in
response to an object (§1), and that they cannot include
personal interest in the existence of the object, because in

that case the judgment would be idiosyncratic rather than
universal (§§2-6).
In the next section, the “key to the critique of taste,” Kant
introduces his thesis that the free play of the imagination and
understanding in response to an object is the nonconceptually-determined yet intersubjectively valid source of a
pleasure about which we can indeed speak with a universal
voice: “Now if the determining ground of the judgment on this
universal communicability of the representations is to be
conceived of merely subjectively, namely without a concept of
the object, it can be nothing other than the state of mind that
is encountered in the relation of the powers of representation
to each other insofar as they relate a given representation to
cognition in general. The powers of cognition that are set
into play by this representation are hereby in a free play, since
no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of
cognition” (§9, 5:217). The heart of Kant’s argument in the
remainder of the “Analytic of the Beautiful” and in the
“Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments” is then that we are
entitled to assume that the “powers of representation” or
cognitive powers, in the case of the beautiful the cognitive
powers of imagination and understanding, work the same way
in all human beings, because without that assumption we
could not assume that any knowledge whatever is
intersubjectively valid (§§21, 38). So if an object genuinely
induces the free play of these powers in one person who
approaches the object under optimal circumstances, it should
do so in anyone else who does the same. This in turn implies
that if any subject has in fact correctly ascribed his pleasure in
an object to that source, something about which Kant insists
no subject can ever be certain (§19), then the subject is
entitled to speak with a universal voice, to “ascribe” assent to
his judgment to others or expect that, if they too judge in
optimal circumstances, circumstances of due attention to the
object and free from distorting personal interests, they will
agree with his pleasure in the object. Kant sums this up thus:
In order to be justified in laying claim to universal assent for
judgments of the aesthetic power of judgment resting on
merely subjective grounds, it is sufficient to admit: 1) In all
human beings, the subjective condition of this faculty, as far
as the relation of the cognitive powers therein set into action
to a cognition in general are concerned, are the same, which
must be true, since otherwise human beings could not
communicate their representations and even cognition itself.
2) The judgment has taken into consideration solely this
relation (hence the formal condition of the power of
judgment), and is pure, i.e., mixed with neither concepts of
the object nor with sensations as determining ground. If an
error is made with regard to the latter, that concerns only the
incorrect application to a particular case of the authority that a
law gives us, by which the authority in general is not
suspended. (§38, Note, 5:290)
The subject who makes a judgment of taste assumes that the
cognitive faculties of all human beings work in the same way,
about which he is supposed to be able to be certain from the
communicability of knowledge in general. And he assumes
further that his own pleasure in an object is in fact due to the
free play of his imagination and understanding with it rather

than to his subsumption of it under a concept or to a merely
idiosyncratic sensation, about which he is not supposed to be
able to be certain. On the basis of those two premises, he is
entitled to speak with a universal voice or assert that others
should agree with his pleasure in the object, although within
the limits of his certainty about the correctness of his
attribution of his own pleasure to the shareable free play of
the cognitive powers. He thus concludes that his judgment is
universalizable, but he does not adopt the Universalizability
Principle as a premise of his judgment.
I have gone on at such length about what Kant actually says
because I take him to be partially right about the case of
aesthetic judgment. I have long argued that he is not right to
assume that the cognitive faculties work in exactly the same
way in every healthy human being, but he is right to argue
that our judgments of taste are justified only to the extent
that we can assume that we do share our general cognitive
dispositions with others and that we have correctly attributed
our pleasure in an object to a shareable disposition rather than
an idiosyncratic condition. I take this to suggest the right
approach to interpretation as well, that is, I take it that a
subject who sincerely offers an interpretation of another’s
words or actions takes his judgment to be justified by his
correct response to the evidence before him and his generally
well-functioning cognitive capacities. He does not appeal to
the agreement of others with his conclusion as justification for
his assumption about the healthy state of his own cognitive
capacities. If the good functioning of his cognitive capacities
were to be questioned, perhaps he would defend himself by
showing how they have led him to the right results in other
contexts and applications, but he surely would not appeal to
the agreement of all other reasonable people with his present
conclusion. That would be circular, for how could he claim to
know who is reasonable if his own reasonableness is seriously
under question? And it would also be unverifiable, for a
reason that Kant would agree with Hume in accepting: no
reasonable human being could ever claim to have surveyed the
response of all other reasonable people. A reasonable person’s
claim that all other reasonable people would agree with him
could only be the consequence of his confidence in his own
reasonableness and his proper assessment of the relevant
data, not a premise of his confidence in his judgment.
Anyone’s assertion that all other reasonable persons would
agree with him as a premise in his justification of a particular
judgment would thus be just as much a piece of insincere
rhetoric as the claim that at least some other reasonable
people agree with him made by the advocate of a deep
interpretation.
4.
That is all I will say about Stern’s general approach to
interpretation. I will now comment on some features of his
approach to the interpretation of artworks in particular. Stern
discusses the interpretation of artworks in Chapter 5 as a main
example of “Contestable Interpretations.” His most general
thesis is that because “Most artworks were created to provide
aesthetic delight, entertainment, or amusement...a wide
notion of understanding in the context of art interpretation
includes appreciation,” and “this wide concept of understanding

is dependent on an equally wide concept of interpretation.”
Indeed, the necessary concept of interpretation is sufficiently
wide that the only restriction that can be placed upon it is that
“The interpretation of an artwork that does not contribute to
its appreciation will be faulted for failing to satisfy the factual
and normative constraints on interpreting” (p. 101). This
would seem to suggest that any interpretation of a work of art
that leads to an appreciation of it in some audience, no matter
how narrow or broad, should count as a good interpretation of
the work of art, thus to a very broad liberalism about the
interpretation of artworks. However, Stern wants to maintain
that in the interpretation of artworks, as in the interpretation
of other acts and speech-acts, there is something that counts
as the “best available” interpretation, and that it is part of the
normative constraint on the interpretation of artworks, as of
anything else, that interpreters should aim for the best
available interpretation. “An amateur critic,” he says, “need
not search for the best available interpretation” but may adopt
one suitable to his own knowledge and education even if he
can “admit that there is at least one better interpretation” that
is unavailable to him “for want of sufficient knowledge or an
adequate interpretation” (pp. 101-2). Stern does not explain
this proviso. You might think that if the point of experiencing
artworks is to gain maximum appreciation from them, then
the best interpretation of an artwork for any particular
interpreter is the one that maximizes his appreciation of it,
even if there is another interpretation available that might
make another interpreter’s appreciation of the work even
greater than the first interpreter’s but which, if adopted by the
first interpreter, would offer him less appreciation than his own
interpretation does. Stern does not suggest such an
argument. What he does do is argue in general that there is
such a thing as the best available interpretation of an artwork
that is not necessarily identical to the artist’s own
interpretation of it, and it is this argument about which I want
to raise a question. I do not want to defend the claim that the
artist’s own interpretation of a work of art is always the best
available definition of it, but I want to question this claim in a
very different way from Stern, a way that should cast doubt
on whether the idea of a best available interpretation for a
work of art makes very much sense at all.
Stern approaches the question of a best available
interpretation for a work of art in the context of the debate
between “intentionalism” and “anti-intentionalism”: “An
intentionalist critic could attribute a characteristic to a given
artwork and support her judgment by claiming that if the
artwork’s creator were in a position to do so, he would agree
with her judgment.” In other words, the artist’s interpretation
determines what counts as the best available interpretation of
the art work. “Her anti-intentionalist colleague could attribute
the same characteristic to that artwork and support her
judgment by claiming that she attributed a characteristic that
is internal to the artwork” (p. 91). In other words, the artwork
means what it does independently of what the artist intended
it to mean or thinks that it means, and the best available
interpretation is the one that best corresponds to what the
work itself means rather than what the artist intended or
thinks. Stern takes the anti-intentionalist side, maintaining
that “Artworks do not contain secrets. Whatever they contain
is, in principle if not in fact, available to all interpreters of a

given artwork....Artworks are better served by focusing on the
artwork rather than its creator; unwarranted interpretations
can be excluded by concentrating on the distinction between
internal and external characteristics of a given artwork” (p.
92). It is this distinction between “external” and “internal
characteristics” of artworks that I want to question. In my
view, all that is strictly “internal” to a work of art is the
physical properties of the work (in the case of works of
autographic art) or of its instantiations or performances (in the
case of works of allographic art), although even those may be
describable only in a multiplicity of convertible descriptions (as
the same size may be measured in different units). In other
words, all that is strictly internal to a poem is a series of black
marks on white paper that could be described by a geometer
or a series of sounds that could be described by a phonologist,
all that is internal to a painting is an array of pigments on a
flat surface that could be described by a geometer working
together with a colorist, and so on. Everything else about the
work subsists in a relation between the physical object and
some group of thinking, intending, and interpreting agents.
That a given series of marks should be interpreted as a poem
in one language rather than a laundry-list in another already
depends upon assumptions about the intentions of the person
or persons who made the marks and the audience they were
intended for. Similarly, that a given array of pigments on a
flat surface is a painting rather than a used palette already
depends upon assumptions about the intentions of the person
who made the marks and the audience he may have intended
them for, and so on. So the recognition of an object as a
work of art at all and as the specific kind of artwork that it is
already depends upon assumptions about intentions that are
ontologically external to the physical object or event being
interpreted. Any meaning the object has and thus anything
about it that is to be interpreted will in this sense already
involve something external to it. The suggestion that the best
available interpretation of an artwork is the one that confines
itself or best confines itself to its internal characteristics cannot
even get off the ground.
If there is any answer to the question about the best available
interpretation of the artwork, it will depend instead upon a
claim about which of the meanings that are external to but
related to the work of art should be decisive for its
interpretation. Now there are at least three kinds of meaning
that can be so related. I have suggested that in order to
interpret a work of art at all it must be recognized, to borrow
terms from Langer or Goodman, as a sign in one language or
symbol-system rather than another. This relates it both to a
language or symbol-system, which might be regarded as a
disposition among some group of persons over some period of
time to attribute meanings to objects, and to a particular
speaker’s or signifier’s intention to make an utterance or
symbol in that language or system. In other words, any work
of art will be related both to some language-meaning and
some speaker’s meaning, and cannot be understood or
interpreted apart from both of those relations. Third, there
are the responses to an object on the part of various
audiences, both an originally intended audience of the object
and many possible subsequent audiences of it. Any audience,
whether one person at one time, several persons at one time,
or several persons at several times, will no doubt find a variety

of meanings in the object, some dependent upon
understanding the language in which it was intended to be an
utterance, others perhaps not, some dependent upon
understanding the intentions of its original author, others not,
some of those no doubt not even foreseeable by the original
author.
In face of these facts, there seems to me to be no prospect for
arguing for anti-intentionalism by appealing to the internal
meaning of an artwork and relegating its author’s intentions
for it to the domain of external meaning. An artwork has no
internal meaning and all of its meanings are, strictly speaking,
external to it. Some other sort of argument has to be found
for minimizing the importance of the artist’s intention and
privileging some other domain of meaning. I do not think that
anyone is going to argue that linguistic meaning, independent
of both speaker’s meaning and audience’s response, is going
to settle what is the best available interpretation of an
utterance. So if the artist’s intention is not to be decisive,
then the most plausible locus for the best available
interpretation will have to be in the domain of audience
response to a work. Then the question of whether there is
such a thing as a best available interpretation will depend
upon whether there is such a thing as the best available
audience for a work. If you think that the decisive normative
constraint on artworks is that they be able to be appreciated,
then that question will in turn become whether there is some
particular audience best qualified to appreciate it. If there is
such a thing as the best available interpretation of an artwork,
it will be the one that makes it most enjoyable for the best
qualified audience for it.
This would seem to be the Humean view. There is noncircularly specifiable body of the most qualified critics of a
given work or genre of art. They are the ones who can best
interpret and most enjoy it, and the rest of us should accept
their interpretation of the work because that will maximize our
own enjoyment of it. Or there is what seems to be Stern’s
variant of this Humean position, namely that while there may
be such a most qualified body of critics and therefore a best
available interpretation of an artwork in principle, in practice
the rest of us will not always have the resources of refinement
and education to be able to enjoy what they enjoy. We should
instead prefer whatever interpretation of a work maximizes our
own enjoyment of it in our actual circumstances, so to speak
an agent-relative rather than agent-neutral interpretation of a
“best available interpretation.” But neither of these positions
seems very attractive to me, in this regard an unreformed
Kantian, because each leaves out something I take to be
essential to aesthetic experience. Namely, it involves what
seems to the subject to be a free play of his or her own
imagination, induced by an object that in the case of art has
been intentionally created by an author, indeed created with
the intention of producing that state, but not dictated by the
author’s intention, the subsumption of the object under
concepts that obviously apply to it, or anything else. Room for
personal freedom in response seems essential to aesthetic
experience, and the idea that there is no “best available
interpretation” of an artwork at all thus seems inherent in the
idea that our experience of artworks is aesthetic. Neither the
artist’s intention nor the interpretation of some especially

qualified body of critics can be determinative, not because
there is some internal meaning to a work of art that is
different from either of those, but because the freedom of
personal response to a work of art is part of what makes the
experience of it aesthetic. Nor should the response of some
particular audience, whether it be of one person or of some
community, be admitted as a sort of agent-relative, secondbest “best available interpretation” due to the inescapable
limitations of the audience’s circumstances. Such a response
should be countenanced because it is the essence of aesthetic
experience.
No doubt any attempt to make my position acceptable would
require that it be able to exclude what Stern calls “off-thewall” interpretations: not any response to a work of art that
makes it enjoyable to some person should be able to count as
an interpretation of it at all. I will not attempt that
reconciliation here. Instead, I will close with the suggestion
that the thought that there can be no “best available
interpretation” for a work of art, a fortiori not one dictated by
the artist’s intention, because of the freedom of response that
is the essence of aesthetic experience, is precisely what is
suggested by Kant’s image of the artistic genius. Kant claims
that successful works of art arise from genius, and that genius
“is a talent for producing that for which no determinate rule
can be given,” and which must instead be a “natural gift”
(§46, 5:307). As a work of genius, a work of art must involve
an “aesthetic idea,” a core of meaning presented in a way that
“by itself stimulates so much thinking that it can never be
grasped in a determinate content, hence which aesthetically
enlarges the concept itself in an unbounded way” (§49,
5:315). The reason why great art can never be produced in
accordance with a rule but only through a natural gift is not
because the artist must be possessed by a daimon, pace Plato,
or is motivated by his subconscious, pace Freud, but simply
because the aim of art is to produce a free play of imagination
and understanding in its audience that is not dictated by a
rule. The artist cannot have a rule for producing a response
that cannot be produced in accordance with a rule. Only a
“free correspondence of the imagination to the lawfulness of
the understanding” (5:317) in the artist can stimulate such a
state in the audience. But even then the response of the
audience cannot seem to be dictated by the artist’s own
intention of and conception of his work because then the
response will still not seem free to the audience. Thus the
artist’s intention cannot be determinative of the best available
interpretation of an artwork, because that would block the
audience’s enjoyment of it through their own free exercise of
their cognitive and therefore interpretative powers. But there
can be no single best audience interpretation of the work
because that too would undermine the sense of free play that
is essential to each and every satisfactory experience of the
work.
It should be clear that I have not agreed with everything that
Laurent Stern has argued, and that even when I have agreed
with some of his conclusions I have not agreed with his
arguments for them. I hope it is equally clear that I have
found this a rich and stimulating work that opens up many
fascinating issues, and I am very grateful to have had the
opportunity to think about it.
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